Potential vulnerability: topic names from ROS parameter

[tandf]

Hi,

We notice that you are using topic names from ROS parameters at the following locations:

costmap_converter/src/costmap_converter_node.cpp

Line 84 in e8c1d2c

costmap_sub_ = n_.subscribe(costmap_topic, 1, &CostmapStandaloneConversion::costmapCallback, this);

costmap_converter/src/costmap_converter_node.cpp

Line 85 in e8c1d2c

costmap_update_sub_ = n_.subscribe(costmap_update_topic, 1, &CostmapStandaloneConversion::costmapUpdateCallback, this);

costmap_converter/src/costmap_converter_node.cpp

Line 86 in e8c1d2c

obstacle_pub_ = n_.advertise<costmap_converter::ObstacleArrayMsg>(obstacles_topic, 1000);

costmap_converter/src/costmap_converter_node.cpp

Line 87 in e8c1d2c

marker_pub_ = n_.advertise<visualization_msgs::Marker>(polygon_marker_topic, 10);

costmap_converter/src/costmap_to_dynamic_obstacles/costmap_to_dynamic_obstacles.cpp

Line 30 in e8c1d2c

odom_sub_ = gn.subscribe(odom_topic_, 1, &CostmapToDynamicObstacles::odomCallback, this);

For security reasons detailed below, we strongly suggest avoiding the usage of strings from parameters as topic names.

Although parameters are usually set in parameter files, they can also be changed by nodes. Specifically, other nodes in the same ROS application can also change the parameters listed above before it’s used, either by accident or intentionally (i.e., by potential attackers). If any of /move_base/local_costmap/costmap, /move_base/local_costmap/costmap_updates, or /odom parameters is changed, the costmap_converter_node will subscribe to the wrong input topics and will fail to read the input data. Moreover, if an attacker exists, she can even first fool the costmap_convert_node to subscribe to a wrong topic like /odom_fake, and then forward messages from /odom to /odom_fake after changing the message contents, which gives the attacker the capability of changing the obstacle positions through the composition of ego motion. The victim robot may navigate to the wrong destinations, and even crash into obstacles. Similarly, the obstacle publisher and marker publisher can also be affected or attacked using the man-in-the-middle way. Because ROS is an OSS (open-source software) community, third-party nodes are widely used in ROS applications, usually without complete vetting of their behavior, which gives the opportunity to potentially malicious actors to inject malicious code (e.g, by submitting hypocrite commits like in other OSS systems [1]) to infiltrate the ROS applications that use it (or software supply chain attacks, one of the primary means for real-world attackers today [2]).

We understand that using parameters to set topic names brings flexibility. Still, for the purpose of security, we strongly suggest that you avoid such vulnerable programming patterns if possible. For example, to avoid the exposure of this specific vulnerability, you may consider alternatives like remapping, which is designed for configuring names when launching the nodes.

[1] Q. Wu and K. Lu, “On the feasibility of stealthily introducing vulnerabilities in open-source software via hypocrite commits,” 2021, https://linuxreviews.org/images/d/d9/OpenSourceInsecurity.pdf.
[2] Supply chain attacks are the hacker’s new favourite weapon. and the threat is getting bigger. https://www.zdnet.com/article/supply-chain-attacks-are-the-hackers-new-favourite-weapon-and-the-threat-is-getting-bigger/.

[tandf]

Hi there, I wanted to follow up on this security vulnerability. Could you please let me know if there have been any updates or concerns regarding this issue? Thanks