Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Riffing on Dennis' idea #7

Merged
merged 6 commits into from
Mar 29, 2024
Merged
Changes from all commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
6 changes: 6 additions & 0 deletions draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -247,6 +247,12 @@ consumption by other programs. In both cases, applications might require
special authorization or they might rely on system-level access control to limit
access to these capabilities.

Forward secrecy guarantees provided in TLS 1.3 (see {{Section 1.2 and Appendix
E.1 of ?RFC8446}}) and some modes of TLS 1.2 (such as those in {{Sections 2.2
and 2.4 of ?RFC4492}}) do not hold if key material is recorded. Access to key
material allows an attacker to decrypt data exchanged in any previously logged TLS
connections.
martinthomson marked this conversation as resolved.
Show resolved Hide resolved

Logging the TLS 1.2 "master" secret provides the recipient of that secret far
greater access to an active connection than TLS 1.3 secrets. In addition to
reading and altering protected messages, the TLS 1.2 "master" secret confers the
Expand Down
Loading